is no such restriction on the legislative power as in things like the Fourteenth Amendment. The limitation of the constitution is not as to the contents of an act but as to its subjects. (3) Residual sovereignty belongs not to the local but to the central government. (4) No popular reserve power of constitutional amendment exists in Canada. This is, without question, an interesting attitude. At least it is certain that the Canadian system did not consciously, as did Australia, attempt the adaptation of the American system to its peculiar problem. Yet it is worth noting that Australia, like Canada, has a parliamentary executive without any marked divergences from American federalism. And both in Canada and Australia the power of judicial review — the real keystone of the federal arch — has been very notably developed, particularly in recent years.

Several minor points of distinct utility may be noted. The remarks on copyright (page 159 *f.*) are wholly admirable and put the problem in the clearest possible light, despite its complexity. The note on estoppel from setting up unconstitutionality as a plea (page 196) is most suggestive. Particularly interesting is the discussion on locally restricted dominion laws (page 88 *f.*). Altogether the volume suggests how differently existing books on American constitutional law might be written if they were intrusted to people with Mr. Lefroy's broad constitutional insight. His work, on its scale, is a model for American lawyers to emulate. H. J. L.

A Source-Book of Military Law and War-Time Legislation. Prepared by the War Department Committee on Education and Special Training. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1919.

The idea of establishing a Students' Army Training Corps in the colleges of the country was well conceived. It is probable that in practice the plan would eventually have worked out well, and that there would have been a reservoir from which young officers could have been drawn. The wisdom of establishing units of the S. A. T. C. in the law schools was much more doubtful. The leading law schools of the country had already been drained of all the students who were available for military service in any form. Only in schools in which high school graduates were admitted could be found possible officer material in any numbers. The plan of the Committee on Education and Special Training of the War Department included a course on International Law, one on Military Law, one on War-Time Legislation, and one on War Issues; and such ordinary law courses as time allowed. It would seem that the committee in attempting to provide for the imparting of information of practical military value and for the general intellectual training of the student in order to make him a more useful member of the army, and in attempting at the same time to assist him in preparing for his subsequent career at the bar, was attempting to ride several horses with very different gaits — a difficult feat even for the War Department. It is difficult to see just what would have been the advantage to the military establishment in keeping students in the law schools. A smattering of legal knowledge would hardly make a young man — certainly not one from eighteen to twenty-one years of age — more useful in the army, even though that knowledge should include a few weeks' acquaintance with International Law, Military Law, and such statutes as the National Defense Act, the Shipping Board Act, the Espionage Act, and the War Risk Insurance Act. And useful as such knowledge is, it could hardly take the place of the usual law courses as a preparation for the practice of the law.

However this may be, if the S. A. T. C. was to be established in the law schools, it was necessary to provide material for the courses to be pursued.

In the course on International Law there was plenty of material available in the way of case-books and text-books. In the course on Military Law the excellent Manual for Courts-Martial was available to take care of the subject of the law relating to the discipline of the army. But there was no book available covering the other subjects included in Military Law and the course on War-Time Legislation. Colonel Wigmore, versatile and ready for any emergency, immediately set to work to have a book prepared and, with the aid of Dean Merton L. Ferson, in a very few weeks produced the source-book. What the book purports to do, it does well; it furnishes an abundance of material for the proposed courses. In it are collected pre-war statutes relating to the military organization, and judicial opinions on a variety of matters affecting "military persons and others who have relations with them;" and war-time statutes, regulations and general orders, federal judicial opinions and opinions of the Judge Advocate General. The war-time statutes include the principal acts of Congress made necessary by the emergency; the war-time judicial opinions and opinions of the Judge Advocate General deal with a vast variety of subjects from the constitutionality of the Selective Service Law to the compensation for labor of prisoners of war. The range of the material is extremely wide; the arrangement is for the most part chronological. Of course no teacher would be cruel enough to take up the subject in the order in which it is presented, nor could he possibly cover all the matter presented; of course it could not have been intended that he should. It would be possible however by a wise selection and arrangement to give a course of considerable interest and perhaps of some value — a course which could not be given without the aid of a book like the source-book. With the signing of the armistice the whole plan fell through and probably nowhere will any course be given based upon the source-book. The book is however available as a useful book of reference. Dramatically it shows how the military problems of peace and the problems of the war were met by Congress, the courts and the War Department. Of especial interest are the opinions of the Judge Advocate General, for only a digest of these is elsewhere published.

AUSTIN W. SCOTT.

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW. By Julius Henry Cohen. D. Appleton and Company. 1918. pp. xx, 339.

The title of this volume rather leads one to expect a discussion of the relative merits of arbitration and ordinary litigation, together with information concerning the actual use made of arbitration in various jurisdictions. There is something of this in the first fifty pages. The treatment however is by the way. It is neither complete nor very well arranged. This is probably explained by the fact that the book, according to the preface, is an amplification of a brief filed in a New York case by Mr. Cohen, as *amicus curiae*, acting at the request of the New York Chamber of Commerce. The only report of that case which has come to the writer's attention is found in 163 N. Y. Supp. 516. It says nothing as to arbitration. Questions of that kind must have been eliminated in the lower court.

The main thesis of Mr. Cohen's work seems to be that courts of law should recognize all agreements for arbitration as valid and enforce them with all the powers at their command. Possibly he goes so far as to believe that courts with equity powers should specifically enforce such agreements. See pages 250, 251, and 274. Of course it is settled law that equity will not specifically enforce them. Probably the best reason for equity's refusal to act is that it would be difficult to supervise the performance of such an intricate proceeding as an arbitration. When Mr. Cohen, on page 251, says that Mr. Justice Story was wrong in his statement that no case supports specific performance of such an